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Abstract
The Cloud computing paradigm provides numerous attractive services to customers such as the provision of the
on-demand self-service, usage-based pricing, ubiquitous network access, transference of risk, and location
independent resource sharing. However, the security of cloud computing, especially its data privacy, is a highly
challengeable task. To address the data privacy issues, several mechanisms have been proposed that use the third
party auditor (TPA) to ensure the integrity of outsourced data for the satisfaction of cloud users (CUs). However, the
role of the TPA could be the potential security threat itself and can create new security vulnerabilities for the
customer’s data. Moreover, the cloud service providers (CSPs) and the CUs could also be the adversaries while
deteriorating the stored private data. As a result, the objective of this research is twofold. Our first research goal is
to analyze the data privacy-preserving issues by identifying unique privacy requirements and presenting a
supportable solution that eliminates the possible threats towards data privacy. Our second research goal is to
develop the privacy-preserving model (PPM) to audit all the stakeholders in order to provide a relatively secure cloud
computing environment. Specifically, the proposed model ensures the quality of service (QoS) of cloud services and
detects potential malicious insiders in CSPs and TPAs. Furthermore, our proposed model provides a methodology to
audit a TPA for minimizing any potential insider threats. In addition, CUs can use the proposed model to periodically
audit the CSPs using the TPA to ensure the integrity of the outsourced data. For demonstrating and validating the
performance, the proposed PPM is programmed in C++ and tested on GreenCloud with NS2 by applying merging
processes. The experimental results help to identify the effectiveness, operational efficiency, and reliability of
the CSPs. In addition, the results demonstrate the successful rate of handling the negative role of the TPA
and determining the TPA’s malicious insider detection capabilities.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Privacy preserving model, Third party auditor, Cloud service provider, Cloud
user, Authentication
Introduction
Cloud computing is an emerging IT environment that
has significantly transformed everyone’s vision of com-
puting infrastructure, development models, and software
distribution. Cloud computing is anticipated as the next
generation high-tech paradigm for tomorrow’s promise
[1]. It provides several utilities as revolutionary gigantic
paradigms where clients can remotely store valuable and
confidential information as to avail from on-demand high
quality computing resources [2]. While data outsourcing
reduces the burden on the cloud users (CUs) from local
storage and management, it brings several open problems
related to the security and privacy of customer’s out-
sourced data. On the other hand, cloud computing eradi-
cates their physical control of data reliability and security,
which can be addressed through the cooperation of three
parties: the cloud service provider (CSP), the third party
auditor (TPA) and the CU. Cloud computing has always
been referred as virtualization of an existing server or data
center. Subsequently, cloud computing is acknowledged
as virtualization of existing data or data centers, providing
multipurpose application support and enormous utility to
remotely available users or clients [3]. This phenomenon
leads to the cloud acting as a service, where services are
provided upon request based on subscription or pay-per-
use [4]. The cloud computing environment stores the
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valuable information and offers attractive user applications
with reliable service support [5]. With the emergence of
new technology, new categories of clouds and services are
introduced such as supercomputing as service (SCaaS)
and high-performance computing as a service (HPCaaS).
From a security perspective, dealing with large amounts
of data is a challenge. The security of CSPs has been inves-
tigated thoroughly from a storage standpoint [6–10]. Two
highly sought CSP features that guarantee privacy protec-
tion are data availability and integrity. Since the CUs do
not have physical access to the outsourced data, it raises
the question of data privacy protection in cloud comput-
ing, particularly for users with very limited computing
resources. Moreover, there are several other factors re-
garding the CSPs corruption that can deceitfully smash
the CUs outsourced data [11]. For instance, a CSP can
attempt to sustain its reputation by hiding the security in-
cidents about the customer’s lost data [12]. Cloud services
can be financially advantageous; however, there is no guar-
antee that the stored data will be secure and available at
all times. If this continues to be an issue and is not thor-
oughly examined, the cloud computing environment may
never reach its full potential.
The massive amount of outsourced data, along with
the CU’s limited resources, can present a daunting
challenge for auditors when examining a cloud service
[13]. One solution to this problem is to maintain a
very low level of cloud storage overhead using min-
imal data retrieval operations. Although we face these
challenges, it is still of utmost importance to develop
trust between the CUs and CSPs.
This is where TPAs could assist in guaranteeing the
CU’s data privacy. Through a fair and impartial audit-
ing process as well as the preservation of the CU’s
computational resources, a higher standard could be
set for trust in cloud services. This auditing process
could also help in improving the QoS provided by
cloud-based platforms and resources. In the field of
data security and privacy, the possibility of an insider
threat can not be avoided. This raises the concern
that a TPA could be malicious. The TPA will have
free and open access to the CU’s data and the cloud
services, which leaves the CU vulnerable to attacks.
Therefore, to circumvent potential financial losses or
insider threats, a strict check and balance process
over the TPA performance should exist. To address
all of these issues, there is a need for a privacy-
preserving model (PPM) that can provide a mechan-
ism to authenticate all cloud stakeholders (i.e., CSP,
TPA and CU) in order to safeguard the cloud com-
puting environment.
To address privacy concerns, researchers have intro-
duced models to ensure data correctness and privacy
protection using protocols across multiple peers and
servers [14–17]. Many of these proposed protocols sup-
port public certifiable remote integrity checking process
[18–20]. However, without proper implementation,
public certifiable auditing would perpetrate CUs a false
perception that their data were undamaged in the CSP’s
data-centers.
The first privacy-preserving public auditing using
blind technique was proposed in [21]. In [21], the
verifier disables the TPA from detecting the file
blocks by disguising the proof with some randomness.
Subsequently, authors in [22] show the exploitation of
the vulnerabilities originating from [18] when specific
file blocks possess low entropy as well as allowing
CUs to audit the TPA themselves to ensure an honest
auditing process. Secure auditable models have been
proposed in [23–26] to ensure integrity of outsourced
data.
Although these computing paradigms introduce the
audibility process, but fail to address the security con-
cerns of the three parties (i.e., CSP, CU, TPA). To ad-
dress these issues from a security perspective, this paper
presents a novel data PPM. Our work is one of the
unique data privacy-preserving contributions with a
focus on auditing the three entities to reduce the trust
deficit between the cloud stakeholders and improve the
reliability of the outsourced data. Our proposed scheme
provides the capability and a complete methodology to
keep checks and balances between each entity in order
to minimize data corruption, preserve data privacy, and
restrict the misuse of resources.
Our proposed model ensures that the TPA does
not have an access to the stored data by assigning
session keys for each auditing task. Once the audit-
ing process is completed, the assigned session keys
will be expired and returned to the pool. In addition,
the CU uses the strong authentication mechanism
(e.g., triple Data Encryption Algorithm and SHA-
256) to protect its outsourced data from potential
attacks. The aggregation and derivative properties of
our model help the three stakeholders to maintain
strong authentication processes. A CU sets its prior-
ities, QoS requirements, and anticipate timeframe for
the completion of each task within the provided ser-
vices. If the CU is not satisfied with the agreed re-
quirements, the model immediately would enable the
CU to refer the issue of incorrectness and inaccuracy
of the paid services to the CSP. This feature of our
proposed scheme not only improves the CUs experi-
ence but also warns the CSP to keep updating the
cloud services and maintaining the agreed QoS ac-
cording to the service level agreement (SLA).
Research contributions
Our research contributions are as follows:
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▪ We provide the bounded-time interval by using ses-
sion keys for each individual auditing service, prevent-
ing malicious insiders from accessing the client’s
confidential data stored in cloud servers.
▪ We embed the mod derivation process to fully secure
the encrypted-message mechanism for authentication
purpose. This feature does not provide any opportunity
for the TPA to become an adversary, while handling
the entire auditing process of each individual CU.
▪ Our proposed model not only ensures that the
allocated resources are correctively delivered to the
CU but also looks for the malicious behavior of
clients to protect the data of other CUs stored in
cloud servers. Thus, our proposed scheme addresses
the security issues related to cloud multitenancy.
▪ We demonstrate and validate the data privacy-
preserving through various experiments. Our
simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness,
reliability, and operational efficiency of CSPs. In
addition, the results show the success rate for
controlling the malicious activities of TPA and validating
the TPA’s malicious insider detection capabilities.
Adversary model
Our primary contribution in this research work is the
proposed PPM that provides separate mechanism for
auditing each cloud entity. An illustration of the pro-
posed model is shown in Fig. 1. The model begins with a
CU obtaining desired services from a CSP for storing
the data, as shown in step 1a of Fig. 1. In response, the
CSP delivers the desired cloud services to the requesting
CU after setting up the necessary SLA (step 1b of Fig. 1).
On the other hand, the CU wants to ensure the privacy
preservation of its outsourced data. Therefore, it pro-
vides the details of the obtained services to the TPA, as
shown in step 2 of Fig. 1. To audit the services provided
to the CU, the CSP issues the key to the TPA for each
auditing session (step 3 of Fig. 1). Once the session key
is assigned to the TPA, the TPA starts the auditing
process, as shown in step 4 of Fig. 1. The CSP checks
the integrity of the TPA to determine whether the
assigned keys are in use for further processes or not
(step 5 of Fig. 1). If a TPA attempts to use any session
key for obtaining the customer’s confidential informa-
tion, this cannot be done since all issued sessions keys
are only effective for a specific period of time for a given
auditing session. Finally, the TPA provides the audit re-
port to the CSP and the CU respectively, as shown in
steps 6a and 6b of Fig. 1.
A malicious third party auditor (TPA)
A cloud environment involves two main entities: one is
the service provider (i.e., the CSP) and the others are the
service utilizers (i.e., the CUs). Both of these entities
interact with each other using various tools and tech-
nologies (e.g., databases, networks, virtualization, operat-
ing systems, transaction management, resource
scheduling, concurrency control, load balancing, and
memory management). Not only the CUs utilize the ser-
vices offered by the CSPs but also often outsource their
sensitive data to the cloud servers. The use of various
technologies and the fact that the customer’s data is not
in-house bring numerous security challenges. Among
those security challenges, encryption and data integrity
is ranked as one of the top concerns of most of the CUs
by the research community [5]. To address the issue of
Fig. 1 Privacy-preserving service oriented architecture for cloud computing
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data integrity and confidentiality, the use of a trusted
TPA has been proposed by several researchers [11, 18].
It has been shown that the TPA can be very effective in
performing several resource consuming tasks (such as
checking the integrity of outsourced data and managing
the encryption keys etc.) on behalf of CUs. Although the
use of the TPA reduces significant computational burden
on CUs, the possibility of malicious insiders at the TPA
cannot be ignored. Therefore, there is clearly a need of a
method that can be used to detect any malicious activities
perform by the TPA. Since TPA servers as a proxy be-
tween the CUs and the CSPs, its integrity should be
checked based on cloud services and customer’s data. An
illustration of the three entities (CUs, TPA, and CSP) is
shown in Fig. 1.
A malicious cloud service provider (CSP)
To ensure the data confidentiality of customer’s data,
most of the existing work relies on the encryption-based
schemes where the encrypted information can only be
accessed by the entity (e.g., CU, CSP, and the TPA) that
possess the encryption keys. Since CSPs may need to
perform frequent computations on the customer’s date
for the offered services (e.g., data searches, modifica-
tions, additions, deletions and insertions), it is consid-
ered as a suitable candidate for holding and managing
the encryption keys. In this way, the CU does not have
to manage and assign the encryption key for each com-
putation services provided by the CSPs. This also avoids
the unnecessary delay that may cause due to the shar-
ing/transmission of encryption keys between the CU and
the CSP. However, it is unrealistic to assume that all
CSPs are trustworthy. They can hide a data loss/leakage
incident from CUs to maintain their high reputation.
For instance, Byzantine failures, server conspiring attack,
malicious data alteration, are some examples that may
result a loss/leakage security incident. In a worst case
scenario, a malicious CSP or malicious insiders at the
CSP can exploit their own privileges by misusing the
encryption keys to compromise the confidentiality of the
customer’s outsourced data, modify or even delete sensi-
tive information without the knowledge of CUs. These
malicious insiders can be categorized in two types. The
first type is involved in debasing the stored CUs data
files from individual servers. Once a server is compro-
mised, a malicious insider can read and modify the con-
tents of the customer’s outsourced data. The second
type of malicious insiders can compromise multiple data
servers by taking advantage of multitenancy and colloca-
tion features of cloud environment. In either case, the
confidentiality and the integrity of outsourced customer
data is at high risk.
SLA violation by cloud user (CU)
In addition to the CSP, a CU can turn into a malicious
entity by purposefully violating the terms and conditions
of the SLA. Once a CU receives services from a CSP, it
can sublet the services to other third-party organizations
or individuals, which can raise serious security concerns
and bring numerous management issues. Moreover, the
subletting of cloud services to third-parties can slow
down the service delivery process from the CSP site. All
such malicious activities can severely affect the reputa-
tion of a CSP and can result into significant business
loss. This clearly demands a periodic audit of CUs to de-
tect any potential violations of SLA. For an unbiased
and fair audit of CUs, a trusted TPA should be consid-
ered as the best candidate for this task.
Proposed privacy preserving model
We develop a new triangular data PPM to authenticate
all the stakeholders (i.e., CU, CSP, and a TPA), as shown
in Fig. 2. This model aims to ensure the integrity of the
CU’s data stored in the cloud data center, which can be
retrieved on-demand at any time. Recent work has
focused more on evaluating the reliability of the CSP in
terms of its security and data privacy measures as well
Fig. 2 A basic Cloud Computing Privacy-Preserving Authenticating Model
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as its compliance with its SLA. However, little work has
been done to evaluate the reliability of the CU and the
TPA. Therefore, our proposed model evaluates the CU’s
integrity in terms of their ability to not violate any of the
agreed upon rules defined and set by the CSP in the
SLA. Furthermore, the TPA audits the services provided
to the CU and ensures the TPA’s integrity (i.e., the TPA
is not disclosing the CU’s contents from the information
obtained through the auditing process).
The CU and the CSP provide a mechanism to audit
the TPA. Thus, the CU verifies whether the TPA per-
forms the assigned auditing within the given specifica-
tion and the time frame. Furthermore, the CSP also
verifies whether the TPA performs its auditing tasks
using the assigned time-released session keys.
The proposed model performs the following function-
alities. For each functionality of the cloud stakeholder,
we provide a mathematical model to derive closed-form
expressions. These functionalities are as follows:
▪ Service Types
▪ Malicious Insider and TPA
▪ CU Authentication for TPA through CSP
▪ CSP Authentication Process
Service types
This section discusses the types of services provided to
the CU and derives a closed-form expression to reflect
the correct delivery of cloud services. Let us assume that
‘N’ is the number of CUs in a given computing environ-
ment where each individual cloud customer (ni) can ob-
tain a maximum of K number of services from a CSP.
The total number of CUs can be expressed as follows: N
= n1, n2, n3,…, nn.
A CU can access the cloud services that are within the
SLA, since services beyond the SLA are restricted. Thus,
the CSP can define security limitations ' L ' for assigned
services (K) such that each offered service (ki) can have
one or more limitations (i.e., Li where i = 1 to K). There-
fore, the security limitations (L) can be expanded up to
the total number of services (K) offered by a CSP. This
relationship can be expressed as follows:
L ¼ L1; L2; L3;…; LK½  ð1Þ
In our proposed model, CUs are allowed to define their
own priorities, quality of service (QoS) requirements, and
anticipate timeframes for the completion of several tasks
within the organization. On the other hand, CUs are re-
quired to meet these specified requirements within the ob-
tained services and the allotted timeframe defined in the
SLA (i.e., allowed time that a CU can use services until the
service-contract expires). We illustrate the allocated service
time for the CU to use the cloud resources as follows:
Ax kð Þ; k ∈ 1; 2; 3;…; Kð Þf g ð2Þ
where 'Ax ' is the amount paid for each service for spe-
cific period of time, ' x ' is the user that can access the
service and ' k ' is the type of service.
Let us consider that each service involves an arbitrary
data set Z = {Z1, Z2,…, Zn} that can be selected independ-
ently. Each query for every member of the data set is de-
noted by Qi = (qi, fi); for i = 0,1,…, n where qi⊆ [n] is the
sub set of the data-set member. Where fi: specifies the func-
tion (e.g., max or sum). Thus, each query has an answer in
the form defined as: Δqi = fi(qi). This can be applied to the
subset of the data set entry as follows: {Zj | j ∈ qi}.
Theorem 1 In the proposed PPM, CUs authorize the
TPA to audit the obtained services by providing the few
samples of services.
Proof Let us prove that the paid amount for provided
services to CUs are correctly stored on the CSP’s server.
Taking this into account, the confirmation process can
be done as follows:
Equation (3) shows the total amount paid against all
the services that are signed in the contract. The TPA
compares the contracted services with the samples pro-
vided by CUs. The TPA based comparison can be shown
in (4) as follows:
In Eq. (4), the CSP confirms the CU’s identity with its
record. If the CUs are legitimate, the TPA is allowed to
compare the samples with the original services. This




n ωð Þ≅ Ts ð5Þ
In Eq. (5), the TPA initiates the matching process of
signed contracts with the samples on record. If the samples
match with the signed contracted services, the provided
service types are considered as legitimate. Furthermore,
the matching process helps increase the trust level of CSPs.
The functional service type behavior is depicted in Fig. 3
and its used notations are described in Table 1.
(3)
(4)
Razaque and Rizvi Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2017) 6:7 Page 5 of 17
Malicious insider and TPA
Let us assume that queries and their answers are pro-
tected by ' γΦ ' for each entry ' Zj ' of malicious insiders
which is bounded by the time interval of ' TI '. An at-
tacker can attempt to generate malicious entry ' Zj ' to
capture the query and its protected answers during the
bounded time interval. However, our objective is to
prevent an attacker from exploiting the privacy of the
protected ' γΦ ' queries and answers. The method for
protecting the information is to use the bounded-time
with the session keys for each individual auditing-
service. The CSP releases the session keys with the
bounded-time for each auditing service. Once the
auditing service is completed, the session keys will be
returned and will not be regenerated until the CSP re-
leases another poll of session keys.
In addition, the malicious insider could be a team
member of the TPA or a CSP. As a result, their illicit at-
tempt is not successful Zj ∉ TI to exploit the protected
data Zj ∈ TI. Therefore, the sequence of queries and their
answers are protected ' γΦ ' from entry ′ Zj ′ due to
bounded-time interval ' TI '. These protected queries and
answers can be written as follows:
γΦ; j;TI q1; q2;…; qnð Þ; a1; a2;…; anð Þf g




i¼0 f i qið Þ ¼ ai
β Zj∈TI





where β: prediction of malicious insider.
Let Z = {Z1, Z2,…, Zn} be the data set where Zi is
selected separately. This complies with the following
statement as: (γΦ, β).
▪ The malicious insider poses the query as
Qm = (qm, fm).
▪ The TPA decides whether to permit the query of a
malicious attacker 'Qm ' or not. The TPA responds with
the following expression Δqa = fa(qa).If Qm is permitted,
Δqa is rejected, otherwise.
▪ Malicious insider is successful if β = fa(qa)
The malicious insider and TPA process is depicted in
Fig. 4. Table 2 lists all the parameters used for malicious
insiders and TPA modules.
Fig. 3 Functional behavior of service-type to ensure the privacy-preserving authentication
Table 1 System parameters and definitions for service type
Notations Description
Ax Amount paid for each service for a particular period
fi Specifies the function (e.g., max or sum).
k Service type
Csp Cloud service provider
L Security limitations
N The number of cloud users
Δqi = fi(qi) Correct answer of each query stored in a cluster
Qi = (qi, fi) Each query for every member of data set
x The user that access the service
n(ω) Contracted services
Z = {Z1, Z2,…, Zn} Arbitrary data set
{Zj | j ∈ qi}. Subset of data-set entry
Adit Third party auditor
Cid Identity of cloud users
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CU authentication for TPA through CSP
Let us assume that ‘φ’ is the outsourced data file of the
CU that consists of ' n ' number of blocks: n = {b1, b2, b3,
…, bn}. The CU chooses the authentication message Ma
¼ ∭nϖ¼0Δsϖ þ log2K
0n  using a secure and strong en-
cryption scheme (e.g., AES Algorithm with SHA-256)
that is modeled as 0∭nϖ¼0Δsϖ
0 with ' log2K
' n ' size of the
message. The chosen authenticated message by the CU





_x: _y ∇βδð Þf g
 
ð7Þ
where ϖ: random number assigning the initial value to
product, (∇βδ) : combination of two randomly chosen
values consists of variable lengths and _x: _y : Quotient
function that is used as a mod function. The detail of
authenticated message with the encryption process is





f zð Þ ∇βδð Þf g
 





 n  s zð Þ
t zð Þ ∇βδð Þ
	 
 
Determining the equivalency of mod derivation to sup-




 n  Δd
Δdz
s zð Þ
t zð Þ ∇βδð Þ
	 
 
Applying the product rule for mod derivation to








t zð Þ: Δd
Δdz
f zð Þ½  þ Δd
Δdz
t zð Þ½ :f zð Þ: ∇βδð Þ
	 
 
Simplifying the process to support the mod derivation
and to show the division with two randomly generated
numbers (∇βδ) for encryption is given as:
Fig. 4 Working process of malicious insider and TPA for guaranteeing the privacy-preserving authentication
Table 2 System Parameters and Definitions for malicious insider
and TPA
Notations Description
Qm = (qm, fm) Query posed by a malicious insider
Qm Malicious attacker
TI Bounded time interval
(γΦ, β). Prediction of the malicious attacker against
protected data (queries and answers)
γΦ Protected data comprising of query and answers
Zj The malicious insider entry
Zj ∉ TI Unsuccessful attempt
Zj ∈ TI Successful attempt
Δqa = fa(qa) Response from TPA for malicious insider to
authenticate itself
β = fa(qa) Successful prediction of malicious insider




 n  ΔdΔdz s zð Þ½ − ΔdΔdz t zð Þ½ :f zð Þ
t zð Þ : ∇βδð Þ
( )" #
Once again, the differentiation of f(z) is required to
hide the encryption and the length of the data file. This




 n  ΔdΔdz s zð Þ½ − ΔdΔdz t zð Þ½ : s zð Þt zð Þ
t zð Þ : ∇βδð Þ
( )" #
To show the complete message encryption to protect
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t zð Þ½ :s zð Þ










If a user is the legitimate CU, then a copy of (∇βδ) is
generated at the server of a CSP. The CSP is required to
identify the generated authentication message of a CU such
that Ma ¼ ∭nϖ¼0Δsϖ þ log2K′ n
 
. The authentication mes-
sage is generated by using a calculated aggregated authenti-
cator to validate whether the message was generated by a








where (∇βδ)N represents the aggregated authenticator
value.
Once the CU’s authentication message matches with the
aggregated authenticator of the CSP, the CU is considered
as a legitimate client within the CSP’s domain. The TPA
can then obtain the secret key from the CSP for each au-
thentication message of the CU to initiate the auditing
process. Specifically, the TPA requires session keys for
comparison of each audit. Thus, it will be harder for the
TPA to expose the outsourced data file ‘φ’ of a CU once
the auditing process is completed. If the TPA attempts to
exploit the outsourced data file of a CU after the auditing
process, it needs a new session key that is not assigned to
the TPA by the CU. However, the TPA may experience
the problem because the auditing process will be limited if
auditing is required more than one time.
All possible secret keys should be able to overcome
this drawback in advance. Once all fixed secret keys are
exhausted, the CU can then retrieve and publish the
data, which complies with the privacy-preserving re-
quirements depicted in Fig. 5. Table 3 lists all the param-
eters used in the TPA module.
CSP authentication process
The CSP’s integrity is of paramount importance for
correct delivery of the services. The CSP’s responsi-
bility is to maximize the guarantee for providing
shared resources to the customers. The CSP provides
numerous resources, which are not only shared by
multiple CUs, but also dynamically reallocated. This
allocation of resources needs to be authenticated for
the CU’s satisfaction. Thus, the TPA not only audits
the CU but also makes sure that the assigned service
is correctly provided as per specification of the CU.
The auditing process begins when the TPA gener-
ates a sample “check message” ′ Cm ′ against each
provided service to the CU to confirm the provided
service by the CSP. The TPA chooses a random value
′ ∀ ∂ ′ for total received services Ts = {s1, s2, s3,…, sn }
for each service provided as quantified in Eq. (1).
Each service has different characteristics that are
attributed by ′ sf ′. Thus, sf ∈ Ts. The TPA checks
some features of service by sending a “check message”
Cm = {sf,… ∀ ∂} sf ∈ Ts to the CSPs server. Upon receiv-
ing the “check message”, the server generates a re-
sponse against “check message” to guarantee the
storage of data correctly. Therefore, the server also
selects the random number ϖ← ℝg and computes its
value such as: ∀ ∂ = (ρ, ℓ )ϖ ∈ ℝg. The following pa-
rameters should be noted: sf: features of each service,
ρ: the service returned by cloud server, ℓ: order-set
for the features of service, and ℝg: Random generator.
Let us assume that ρ* represents the combination of
sampled blocks that are specified in 'Cm ', Thus, sampled





In response to the sampled blocks, the server com-
putes the requested service ' ρ ' for the TPA to prove its
integrity and ensure that the CU is correctly provided
the requested services. To satisfy the TPAs requested
query, the requested service should be delivered to the
TPA using full encryption along with the sampled
blocks. This compares the sampled blocks of requested
service with the original service provided to the CU and







 n  

Δd
Δdz s zð Þ½ :t zð Þ− ΔdΔdz t zð Þ½ :s zð Þ
t zð Þ : ∇βδð Þ
( )
ð11Þ
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If the CSP fails to provide the proper services accord-
ing to the SLA, it may attempt to launch different kinds
of attacks such as a forge attack, replay attack, distrib-
uted denial-of-service attack, etc.
To expose the attacks that are launched by a CSP, we
examine if the “check message” 'Cm ' or its data tag 'ℵt '
is bastardized. If they are corrupt, the TPA’s verification
request that determines the correctness of the service
assigned to the CU cannot be processed. As a result, the
server impersonates the original TPA’s “check message”
including its data tag 'ℵt ', and replaces them with the
fake “check message” ' Fm ' and fake tag ' Ft '’. The imper-
sonated message ' ∄ ℝm ' forwarded to the TPA with en-









Δdz s zð Þ½ :t zð Þ− ΔdΔdz t zð Þ½ :s zð Þ
t zð Þ : ∇βδð Þ
( )
ð12Þ
where, ' O: Output check-message, and Dbi: Blocks of
data sent in check-message.
Once the CSP forwards an encrypted impersonated
message ' ∄ ℝm ' to the TPA, the TPA compares the CSP’s
message with (Cm,ℵt) to help determine a CSP’s illegit-
imate action that is compared and shown in Fig. 6.
If , the CSP provides
legitimate service(s) to the CU and fulfils the data-
privacy requirements. On the other hand, if the above
expression is not equivalent, it implies that the user data
confidentiality is compromised and the CSP provides
unstandardized services to the CU. Table 4 shows the
parameters used for authenticating CSPs.
Fig. 5 Authentication of CU to maintain the privacy preserving process
Table 3 System Parameters and Definitions of CU module for
TPA
Notations Description
(∇βδ)N Aggregated authenticator value
n = {b1, b2, b3,…, bn} Number of data blocks
log2K
n′ Size of the encrypted message
∭
n
ϖ¼0Δsϖ Secure and robust encryption method
_x: _y: Quotient function that is used as mod
φ Outsourced data file of CU
ϖ Random number
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Experiments and performance evaluation
We test the performance of the proposed privacy-
preserving model (PPM) involving the three entities (i.e.,
CSP, CU, and TPA). The proposed model is pro-
grammed in C++ and tested on the GreenCloud simula-
tor, the extension of the Network Simulator 2 (NS2).
The GreenCloud and NS2 are installed using the mer-
ging process. A 2.8 GHz Pentium Dual Core CPU with
5 GB RAM powered computer using a default Ubuntu
12.04 OS is used to run the experiments. The test ma-
chine uses a 64-bit version of Windows 8. The Green-
Cloud presents the repeatable and controllable
environment to show the realistic behavior. We test the
proposed model for different scenarios to demonstrate
the validity of the three entities. Specifically, the follow-
ing parameters are observed:
▪ Effectiveness of CSP
▪ Operational efficiency of CSP
▪ TPA malicious attempts and successful rate
▪ Reliability of CSP versus number of auditing
Effectiveness of cloud service provider (CSP)
In the first scenario, we investigate the effectiveness of
the CSP based on the provided services to CUs. The ef-
fectiveness of the proposed PPM was evidenced in the
obtained results which are relatively similar to the realis-
tic environment. The PPM measured the performance of
the CSP for ideal (PPM-I), expected (PPM-E), and
worst-case (PPM-W) scenarios, as depicted in Figs. 7
and 8. We analyze the effectiveness of the CSP by in-
creasing the number of provided services to the CU. As
the number of services to CU is increased over the time,
a slight decrease is observed in the effectiveness of the
CSP. In all three cases, the proposed PPM demonstrates
the realistic behavior of the CSP. The effectiveness of
the CSP in the expected case was the reconfirmation
that the PPM-E was not entirely approaching the theor-
etical maximum of the PPM-I. Similarly, in the case of
PPM-W, the PPM-E performance was more realistic for
the effectiveness of the CSP.
It was validated that the proposed model is well-ordered
and remained bounded by a different number of services
for most of the simulation time. Hence, it can be implied
that the proposed PPM system remains stable in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the CSP. The reason for the
performance degradation of the CSP was mainly the in-
volvement of some impairing factors such as malicious in-
siders and outsiders that added into the system as more
services are delivered by the CSP. If the role of the mali-
cious adversary is entirely neglected, the effectiveness of
the CSP could be much better. However, the possibility of
all potential attacks on the CSP cannot be disregarded;
otherwise, the effectiveness of a CSP in a realistic environ-
ment could not be analyzed in an organized way.
Operational efficiency of cloud service provider (CSP)
Both Figs. 9 and 10 demonstrate the operational effi-
ciency of the CSP versus the number of users. The simu-
lation results exhibit this by increasing the number of
Fig. 6 Identifying the authentication process of CSP for fulfillment of data-privacy requirement
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CUs which decreases the operational efficiency for all
three cases (i.e., PPM-I, PPM-E, and PPM-W), as shown
in Fig. 10. The generated scenarios for determining the
operational efficiency of the CSP is more realistic than
expected for the proposed PPM. Therefore, we focus
more on some of the limitations affecting the CSP such
as rapid business changes, highly competitive markets,
unpredictable economic environments, and dealing with
more regulations. In accordance with our expectations,
as the number of CUs increases (e.g., see Fig. 10), the
overall operational efficiency for the three cases should
fluctuate as compare to Fig. 9. However, the worst case
scenario (PPM-W) profoundly affected the operational
efficiency, as depicted in both Figs. 9 and 10.
In addition to an increase in the CUs and their re-
spective services, the network and server delays also play
a role in degrading the overall operational efficiency of
the CSPs. The operational efficiency of the CSP could be
improved, if we guarantee that all connections are pro-
tected prior to binding the cloud applications. For more
accurate results, we need to know whether CUs are
required to sign into a protected connection first, and
then into the cloud application or if it is manageable and
reachable ubiquitously.
TPA malicious attempts and successful rate
The primary challenge in protecting data privacy is to
handle the malevolent role of the TPA. In the cloud
storage system, the CUs host their data on the CSP’s
servers that can be accessed from anywhere. Due to
data outsourcing, the TPA’s fraudulence could damage
the CSP’s image. In addition, the confidential infor-
mation of CUs could be exploited or leaked to adver-
saries. In Fig. 11, we demonstrate the malicious
attempts of the TPA versus the successful malicious-
detection of the proposed PPM.
While handling the malicious attempts of the TPA,
different scenarios were generated for three different
cases: ideal, expected, and worst. The PPM captured all
the malicious attempts in an ideal case (PPM-I) and pro-
vided a success-rate reaching 100%. On the other hand,
the PPM received the successful capturing rate of 96.6%
and 88.3% for expected (PPM-E) and worst case (PPM-
W) scenarios, respectively. The expected successful rate
could be improved if a malicious insider did not help the
TPA to gain access to sensitive information by recuper-
ating the data blocks from a data proof. However, the
malicious role of a CSP cannot be ignored, leaving the
TPA’s newly generated content keys useless against each
CU’s stored information. The simulation results are
comparatively similar to a realistic environment and also
confirm the correctness of the proposed PPM.
Reliability of cloud service provider versus number of
auditing
The reliability of the CSP is a significant concern. When
referring to the reliability of the CSP, it is mainly mea-
sured in terms of how secure the customer’s data is at
the data center and how securely the cloud services are
delivered to the CUs. Figure 12 demonstrates the reli-
ability of the CSP for different scenarios: an ideal, ex-
pected, and worst case. The primary goal of our
experiment is to validate the PPM for various scenarios
to evaluate the reliability ratio of the CSP versus the
number of audits performed on the customer’s data and
the cloud services.
The simulation results show that the PPM-I produced
90.2% reliability of the CSP. However, in the expected
and worst cases, the results show further decline in the
reliability of the CSP as more auditing is done. Hence,
the PPM-W confirmed the higher drop rate in the reli-
ability of the CSP. Based on the number of auditing, the
CSP will be able to maintain approximately 90.2% reli-
ability for PPM-I, as shown in Fig. 12. In an expected
Table 4 System Parameters and Definitions for the authentication
process of CSP
Notations Description
Cm Check the message used by TPA to examine the
correctness of contents stored on a cluster
Dbi Blocks of data sent in check-message
(Fm, Ft) Fake check message and fake tag generated by
CSP if not provided the required service to CU
(γΦ, β). Prediction of the malicious attacker against protected
data (queries and answers)
γΦ Protected data comprising of query and answers
Zj The malicious insider entry
Zj ∉ TI Unsuccessful attempt
Zj ∈ TI Successful attempt
Δqa = fa(qa) Response from TPA for malicious insider to
authenticate itself
β = fa(qa) Successful prediction of malicious insider
sf The features of each service assigned to CU
ϖ←ℕ Generation of random number by TSP
ρ* Representing the combination of sampled blocks
ℝg Random generator of TSP
∄ℝm Impersonated message created by the server
'O Output for check-message
ℵt Data tag generated by TPA to validate the CSPs
provided services to CU
Determining the CSPs illegitimate action
s zð Þ
t zð Þ Derivative of two quotients
∀ ∂ TPA chooses a random value for checking the CSPs
provided service
ℓ Set of the features
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Fig. 7 Effectiveness of CSP VS relatively smaller number of services to Cloud Users
Fig. 8 Effectiveness of CSP VS relatively larger number of services to Cloud Users
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Fig. 10 Operational Efficiency VS number of cloud users (for a relatively larger cloud network)
Fig. 9 Operational Efficiency VS number of cloud users (for a relatively smaller cloud network)
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Fig. 11 Number of malicious attempts of TPA versus successful rate of detecting the malicious behavior
Fig. 12 Reliability of CSP on Number of Auditing
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scenario (PPM-E), an approximately 85.2% reliability ra-
tio was observed. In the third scenario, worse case
(PPM-W), approximately 70% reliability of the CSP was
noted. This simulated behavior implies that the PPM is
capable of determining the reliability ratio of the CSP
for all three cases. If a CSP is able to maintain an ex-
pected reliability ratio, the advantage of storing the con-
fidential data with the CSP will greatly help in evolving
the trust between CUs and service providers.
Related work
Most of the existing work [27–29] on the data privacy
preservation is based on web services, which address the
issues of data control and security in a cloud environ-
ment. This includes data access, data integrity, data re-
covery, data separation, data disposition, and data
regulations [27]. Sengupta et al. [28] addressed the cloud
security and privacy concerns such as data access, data
compliance, and cloud hosted code. Rabai et al. [29] in-
troduced a quantitative cloud security model which
helps the subscribers and providers to measure the se-
curity risks related to the resources. The model assists
the subscribers and providers to investigate and identify
the security related issues. In addition, the model takes
certain attributes into account when making the security
decisions, such as economics, stakeholders, and hetero-
geneities. Yuhong et al. [30] proposed a new EnTrust
framework which integrates the encryption and trust-
based techniques to preserve the cloud’s storage privacy.
Specifically, the proposed framework contains three
components: an encryption module, a trust evaluation
module and a decision module.
Trusted third party protocols for securing the cloud
computing environment were introduced in [31] and
[32]. Zissis et al. [31] discussed the TPAs working princi-
ples and its security concerns. Thamizhselvan et al. [32]
proposed a model that uses a third party security vendor
that takes care of encryption and decryption of the data
based on the CU’s preferences. The public verifiability
protocol without the use of a TPA was proposed in [33].
The protocol involves features that do not disclose any
confidential information to the TPAs. The protocol dem-
onstrated the accuracy and security parameters through
formal analysis. Based on the experimental results, the
authors claimed that the proposed protocol performed
better in remote data cloud storage.
The trusted computing environment was proposed in
[34], which involves the trusted computing module in the
cloud computing environment. The trusted computing
module focuses on the confidentiality, integrity, and the
authentication. However, the module does not provide val-
idation proof. A third party auditing protocol was intro-
duced to keep online storage secure by encrypting the data
before applying the hash functions using the symmetric-
keys [25]. The auditor verifies the integrity of the received
data and decrypts key at the server side. This proposed
protocol experiences problems due to limited features that
potentially exert an excessive overhead on the servers.
Rosa et al. [35] proposed a privacy-enhancement and
trust-aware IdM mechanism which is based on the
SAMLv2/ID-FF standards. The primary objective of this
mechanism is to obtain an effective access control and
identity management. A similar scheme was proposed
by Siani et al. [36] to mitigate the data protection risks
using a privacy management architecture. In their pro-
posed architecture, the privacy manager is responsible to
preserve the privacy for cloud computing technologies.
Another privacy-preserving scheme was introduced in
[37] for protecting the privacy of individuals in cloud
computing environment. The authors attempt to induce
the significance of privacy at all levels when designing,
collecting, sharing, and processing the cloud’s services.
However, their research only focueses on the notion of
privacy, but no proof was provided to handle the data
privacy issues.
Cong et al. [38] proposed a privacy-preserving public
auditing system for data storage security in cloud com-
puting. Specifically, the proposed system introduced the
homomorphic linear authenticator with the random
masking to prevent a TPA in accessing the contents of
the customer’s outsourced data during the auditing
process. The proposed system enables a TPA to perform
multiple auditing tasks in a batch processing mode for
improved efficiency.
Hassan et al. [39] highlighted the fast adoption
deferring-reasons for cloud security. Addressing this
issue, a comprehensive cloud security framework was in-
troduced to resolve the deferring-reasons for cloud se-
curity. This framework involves the following modules:
the policy integration module, access control, trust man-
agement, service management, authentication, hetero-
geneity management and identity management. Pelin et
al. [40] proposed an authentication framework to detect
the cloud computing entities such as cloud as user and
services. The authors use the identity management mod-
ule to address the privacy and identity issues. Recently,
Abdul et al. [41] proposed a triangular data privacy-
preserving scheme that supports public auditing with
the capability of auditing all the key stakeholders for
achieving optimal security in a cloud environment.
Conclusion
To guarantee data privacy in a cloud computing
environment, it is essential to introduce a new
scheme to authenticate the three cloud stakeholders
(i.e., CSP, CU and TPA). Thus, the proposed triangle
authentication process enables the three stakeholders
to detect the negative role of each other. Another
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concern is how to design a privacy-preserving model
to restrict the potential TPA vulnerabilities, control
the malicious insider threats in CSPs, and determine
the CUs deceitful role of distributing the obtained
service to other clients. In this paper, we explored the
integrity and privacy-related challenges among the
three entities. To build a secure and efficient cloud
computing environment, we extend and improve the
existing CSP and TPA security models by leveraging
the properties into a single triangular data privacy-
preserving model to provide the auditing capability to
all the key stakeholders. To support efficient and
effective triangular auditing tasks, the scope of our
privacy-preserving model is limited to: (a) guaranteeing
the TPA’s integrity, (b) administering the firm compliance
of SLA by both the CSP and CUs, (c) authoring the exact
use of allotted session keys for auditing the confidential
data stored on the cloud’s server, and (d) confirming the
message authentication at the cloud service provider’s
side. The TPA audits the CSP to confirm the privacy of
the CUs’ outsourced data. The TPA also monitors the re-
sponse provided by the CUs for the utilized services ac-
cording to the SLA. Finally, an audit of the TPA is
performed by both CSPs and CUs to reduce the probabil-
ity of any possible malicious insider threats. To validate
the correctness and soundness of the proposed work, an
experimental analysis is conducted, which proves that the
proposed PPM is highly efficient for preserving the data
stored in the cloud computing environment.
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